ABSTRACT End-to-end (E2E) physical layer authentication for multi-hop wireless networks is still not well-explored by now. Like one step forward in this direction, this paper focuses on the E2E physical layer authentication in a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay and proposes a corresponding physical layer authentication scheme. The scheme fully utilizes the location-specific features of both channel amplitude and delay interval of cascaded channels and adopts the artificial jamming technique, so that it is not only resistant to the impersonate attack from an unauthorized transmitter but also resilient to the replay attack from the untrusted relay. Theoretical analysis is further conducted to derive the expressions for the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection, which are two fundamental metrics of authentication performance. Finally, the numerical and simulation results are provided to illustrate both the efficiency of these theoretical results and the E2E authentication performance of dual-hop wireless networks under the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication serves as a critical property of secure communication to verify the identity of the entity involved in the communication. With the rapid development of wireless technologies, the flexible and cost-effective authentication is becoming an increasingly urgent demand for future wireless networks. This is because that on one hand, the open and broadcast natures of wireless communications make wireless networks more vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where an unauthorized transmitter may impersonate as legitimate one. On the other hand, with the wide deployment of Internet of things (IoT) [1] , [2] and continuous evolvement of wireless technologies toward the fifth generation (5G) networks [3] , it is foreseeable that future wireless networks will be consisted of an unprecedented huge number of heterogeneous
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devices, making the authentication in such networks a challenging issue.
Conventionally, authentication is implemented based on the cryptographic technique [4] - [6] , where it is usually assumed that a secret key is shared in advance between the transmitter and receiver. Nevertheless, the authentication relying on this assumption is increasingly being questioned in emerging network scenarios such as IoT, low power wide area networks [7] and 5G wireless systems [8] . This is mainly due to the reasons that distribution and management of secret keys become troublesome and even impossible in such large-scale heterogeneous networks. Also, the distributed nature of these scenarios makes the stored secret keys vulnerable to physical attacks. E.g., an attacker may capture a legal device and break the keys via hardware level attacks.
Recently, physical layer authentication (PLA) technique, which exploits the intrinsic and unique features of physical layer for authentication, has drawn a considerable attention to enhance and complement the conventional cryptographybased authentication solutions. By now, some research efforts have been devoted to the study of PLA methods. These PLA methods can be roughly classified into three categories: fingerprinting authentication, watermarking authentication and channel-based authentication. Fingerprinting authentication is based on the intrinsic characteristics of transceiver hardware for authentication, e.g., the radio frequency-distinct native attribute [9] - [12] . Polak and Goeckel [9] explored the analysis of distortion signals resulting from hardware impairments to identify wireless devices. Wang et al. [11] further examined the reliability and differentiability of such methods via theoretical modeling as well as experiment validation. It was proved that phase noise can be used to authenticate transmitters through multiple kernel [12] .
Watermarking authentication is based on superimposing watermarking information to modulated signals to conduct authentication [13] - [17] . A watermarking-based authentication scheme, which relies on a cryptography secure lowpower authentication tag hidden in the modulated signals for authentication, was investigated in [13] . Based on the work of [13] , Verma et al. [14] further conducted the tagbased authentication experiments in software defined radio system to demonstrate the authentication performance of such method. An extension of the conventional watermarking methods was proposed in [15] to authenticate wireless devices by jointly utilizing the side-channel information and tag selection.
The main idea of channel-based authentication is that channel state information is location-specific according to the radio propagation theory [18] . It is difficult for an adversary to precisely build the same channel that is being used by a legitimate transmitter-received pair. Xiao et al. [19] presented a channel-based authentication scheme exploiting the spatial variability of channel frequency response over time-varying channels in a rich scattering environment. Xiao et al. [20] further explored the channel-based authentication by using the temporal channel variations of channel impulse response to authenticate transmitters at different locations in frequencyselective Rayleigh channels. Based on [19] and [20] , Liu and Wang [21] proposed a novel authentication scheme over time-varying multipath channels jointly using the location-specific properties of both amplitude and multipath delay of wireless channels to authenticate transmitters. Xiao and Han [22] further proposed a logistic regressionbased authentication exploiting channel state information and multiple landmarks to improve the spoofing detection accuracy.
It is notable that above available works mainly focus on one-hop PLA, where transmitters and receivers can communicate with each other directly. In the large-scale distributed wireless networks such as IoT and 5G wireless systems [8] , the end to end (E2E) communication is usually conducted with the help of relay(s) [23] - [25] . Due to transmission efficiency, delay and secrecy constraints, the multi-hop E2E PLA is an important research issue in wireless communication scenarios, where relay only needs to amplify and forward the signals transmitted by the transmitter to the legitimate receiver, or to decode the signals and then forward them to the legitimate receiver. To the best of our knowledge, the multihop E2E PLA is still not well-explored yet. Notice that the available one-hop PLA schemes can not be directly extended to multi-hop E2E PLA mainly due to the following challenges. First, the cascade channels between the transmitter and receiver become much more dynamic and complicated, making multi-hop E2E PLA more challenging [26] . Second, the relay can be potential adversary to record the received signals and initiate replay attacks, bringing new threat to the E2E PLA.
As one step towards the study of E2E multi-hop PLA, this paper focuses on the channel-based E2E PLA in a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay. This is because the dual-hop wireless networks are simple and serve as a foundation for the study of general multi-hop wireless networks. By carefully exploiting the highly dynamic properties of the dual-hop cascade channels, we develop an efficient E2E PLA scheme to discriminate transmitters at different locations. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose a new E2E PLA scheme for dual-hop wireless networks with an untrusted relay. This scheme utilizes the location-specific features of both channel amplitude (CA) and delay interval (DI) of cascaded channels to discriminate transmitters, and adopts the artificial jamming technique to resist against possible replay attack from the untrusted relay.
• Using statistical signal estimation theory and the twodimensional quantizers, we can qualify the temporal variations of CA and DI of cascaded multipath channel.
• Based on the hypothesis test theory, theoretical analysis is then conducted to derive the expressions for probabilities of false alarm (FA) and missed detection (MD), such that E2E authentication performance under the proposed E2E PLA scheme can be fully depicted.
• Finally, extensive numerical/simulation results are provided to validate theoretical results for the probabilities of FA and MD and to illustrate the authentication performance for the proposed E2E PLA scheme. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II depicts the system model involved in this study. Section III presents the proposed E2E PLA scheme and carries out the related security analysis. The modeling of the probabilities for FA and MD is provided in Section IV, and the numerical/simulation results are showed in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
Notation: (·) * denotes conjugate operator. | · | denotes absolute operate. N (µ, σ 2 ) and CN (µ, σ 2 ) denote real and complex Gaussian distributions with mean µ and variance σ 2 , respectively. E{·} and Pr(·) represent expectation and probability operators, respectively. exp(·) denotes exponential function. Laplace(µ, b) denotes Laplace distribution with location parameter µ and scale parameter b. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. NETWORK MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 1 , we consider a dual-hop wireless network scenario consisting of four entities: one legitimate transmitter Alice (A), one untrusted relay (R) adopting the amplifyand-forward (AF) strategy, one intended receiver Bob (B) and one adversary Eve (E). Each entity is equipped with an omnidirectional antenna and operates in half-duplex mode. These entities are spatially located at separated positions in a rich-scattering environment (e.g., in urban area). We assume that the spatial separation between any two entities is more than a distance of half a wavelength, making fading paths independent of each other according to the well-known Jakes uniform scattering model [18] . This is widely adopted in [19] - [21] and [27] and reasonable because if two entities are spaced within a distance of half a wavelength, they will fail to work due to mutual strong interference.
The direct link between A (E) and B suffers from the deep fading so that they can only communicate with the help of R. R can record all the received signals and then initiate replay attacks with the aggressive signals, that is, R serves as a potential adversary. The adversary E monitors the network and attempts to inject aggressive signals into the network in the hope of impersonating A. B not only can receive signals but also can transmit signals (e.g., jamming signals) to R. We assume that adversaries have the knowledge of the modulation method employed in the network, the channel estimation technique employed by B and authentication scheme adopted in the network [19] , [28] . Similar to that of previous studies [19] , [20] , we further assume that E cannot arrive at A's previous location before a new signal arrives at B.
Suppose that B receives two messages (i.e., frames) at times t − 1 and k (time interval is much less than the channels coherence time). The first one is validated by B from Alice using a standard higher-layer protocol [29] . Based on this authentication, B measures and stores not only the channel connecting A and R with him in terms of CA and DI at time t − 1. The objective of authentication at B is that utilizing multipath channel estimation for R-B and A-R-B in terms of amplitude and delay based on previous message originated from A, he needs to decide whether the second message received at time t is still from A. We stress that the message to be authenticated is not required to transmit continuously but it is necessary to ensure the continuity of the authentication process by probing the channel at time intervals smaller than the channels coherence time [19] - [21] , [30] , [31] .
We assume that the channels are reciprocal and remains correlated within the total processing time, which mainly includes propagation delay, transmitting time and operation (e.g., AF operation) delay at each entity. This is due to the fact that the total processing time is much less than channel coherent time T C , For example, for a typical f = 2.4 GHz radio frequency carrier, relative motion speed v = 2 m/s, T C can be calculated as T C = 9c 16πvf =11.2 ms (c is light speed). The propagation delay might be 30 µ s for a rich scattering environment (will be at least 10 µs) if the distance is 3 km. Transmitting time is 0.5 µs for a frame consisting of 20 symbols when symbol sampling rate is 40 MHz. In general, the operation delay has the same order of transmitting time.
B. CHANNEL MODEL
Since all entities are in a rich scattering and reflecting environment, channel impulse response of each hop in the concerned dual-hop network is modeled as a sum of paths with time-varying CA and propagation delay caused by the changes in the propagation environment (e.g., relative motion between entities and/or movement of scatterers/reflecors). Considering N ij multipath channels between two entities i and j, channel impulse response measured at time t under the delay spread index denoted by d can be expressed by
where h n ij (t) and Each multipath component is assumed to be suffer from statistically independent Rayleigh fading and CA and propagation delay of that are assumed to remain constant over a frame (message transmission is organized by frame-byframe) but to vary independently and continuously from one frame to the next. Such temporal variations in terms of CA and delay are highly correlated [32] , [33] . Thus, h n ij follows a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution. In general, for a specific multipath channel their channel amplitudes might not be identical variance (e.g., in the case of an exponential power delay profile). To simplify the considerations, we assume that channel amplitudes have an identical variance, i.e., h n ij ∼ CN (0, σ 2 h ij ) [19] - [21] .
To explore the temporal variation of channel amplitude, we need to investigate the auto-correlation function of channel amplitude. According to the Jakes' model [18] , channel variation is affected by the Doppler frequency. Similar to that of previous studies [19] , [21] , [34] , identical maximum Doppler frequency is considered in multipath channels. Then, the auto-correlation function of h n ij (t) under arbitrary time lag t s , can be given by
where J 0 (·) is the zero th order Bessel function of the first kind. f ij is maximum normalized Doppler frequency. Based on the above results, we employ the auto-regressive model of order 1 (AR-1) [19] , [21] , [34] to describe time-varying channel amplitude, and then we have
where AR coefficient α ij is denoted by
) is independent of h n ij (t − 1). Moreover, the propagation delay of multipath components can be modeled by a Poisson process [35] . Therefore, delay interval (DI) between two delays of adjacent multipath components at time t is an exponentially distributed random variable, which is defined by
One can easily see that τ k ij (t) is also time-varying. Similar to the simple assumption for h n ij , we also assume that τ k ij (t) is statistically independent and identically distributed random variable [21] .
We adopt correlated Gaussian random variables to characterize the correlation between τ k ij (t − 1) and τ k ij (t). This is reasonable due to the fact that an exponentially distributed random variable can be decomposed as the sum of the squares of two independent Gaussian distributed random variables. Hence, τ k ij (t − 1) and τ k ij (t) can be decomposed, respectively, as
where τ
are mutually independent Gaussian distributed random variables with zero mean and variance σ 2 τ ij . Similar to previous work [21] , we also use AR-1 to model the temporal processes of τ , and then we have
where AR coefficient β ij has the similar definition with α ij given in (3); u
C. COMMUNICATION MODEL
Frame-by-frame transmission is considered in this paper.
A transmission frame consists of deterministic pilot symbols used to channel estimation and stochastic data symbols. When A transmits a signal s(t) to B at time t with the aid of R. The total transmission is accomplished by the following two phases. For Phase I, A transmits the signal s(t) at the average transmitted power P to R and the signal received at R is (8) where w R ∼ CN (0, σ 2 w ) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN).
For Phase II, y R (t) is then multiplied by an amplification factor ρ and retransmitted to B at power P. The amplification factor commonly used in the literature is
Since the transmitting time and operation delay is much less than the operation delay (see Section II-A), so we can neglect the transmitting time and operation delay. Therefore, the AWGN at B is denoted by w B ∼ CN (0, σ 2 w ), and then the corresponding received signal at B is given in (10) , as shown at the bottom of this page.
From (10), we know that the channel impulse response from the transmitter to the receiver via the relay is a cascade of the multipath channels in two hops, i.e., it is a cascaded multipath channel. According to [32] , the double (cascaded) Rayleigh fading model can be used to characterize such cascaded multipath components. The CA of each cascaded multipath component is the product of CAs of two multipath components in two hops over this cascaded path, and the corresponding delay is the sum of delays of two multipath components in two hops over this cascaded path. The CA of the n th AB cascaded multipath components for A-R-B is denoted by
where
Then, the corresponding DI is denoted by
When E transmits signals to B, it has the same the transmission process.
Using methods in [36] - [40] , B can estimate cascaded multipath channel parameters from the received signal in (10) In addition, channel and delay estimation are corrupted by estimation error (additive noise). and such estimation error is much less than the temporal variations of channel and delay [21] . Therefore, both CA and delay of channels can be utilized to differentiate between the legitimate transmitter A and illegitimate transmitter E.
III. E2E PLA SCHEME
The basic principle for the proposed E2E PLA scheme is that the channels are location-specific, which has been widely adopted for authentication transmitters to complement and improve traditional security approaches [19] - [21] , [27] . Most importantly, this is demonstrated by the well-known Jakes model [18] , that is, the spatial separation of one to two wavelengths results in independent fading channels. It is difficult (if not impossible) for an attacker to generate or accurately model the channel being used by transmitter-receiver pair. In other words, the channels between different geographic locations decorrelate rapidly in space due to path loss and channel fading [18] , [19] . As a result, the channel of A-R-B is independent of that of E-R-B. Meanwhile, the channel for the identical transmitter-receiver pair is highly corrected over time. Hence, CA and DI of multipath channels can be jointly exploited to authenticate transmitters. The main procedures of the proposed E2E PLA scheme are illustrated in Fig. 2 , where a typical challenge-response procedure is first conducted to initiate the authentication process. The transmissions of authentication and jamming signals is then implemented between entities involved in communication. Finally, B carries out a verification procedure to verify whether the current frame is from A or not.
A. CHALLENGE-RESPONSE PROCEDURE
In the available authentication schemes developed for wireless systems with direct link between an unknown transmitter X (i.e., X = {A, E}) and the receiver B [19] - [21] , [27] , the transmitter can directly send authentication signals to the receiver B anytime without pursing the synchronization with the receiver in advance. For the dual-hop wireless system with an untrusted relay R concerned in this paper, however, to deal with the possible replay attack from R based on our proposed E2E PLA scheme, the synchronization between the transmitter and receiver B is required before the authentication process. For this purpose, the transmitter first sends an authentication request frame (i.e., a challenge), which contains only the synchronization signal indicating the time that the authentication signal is to be transmitted, such that the synchronization between the transmitter and B can be achieved in the next transmission process of authentication and jamming signals.
After receiving the authentication request from A, B sends back a response frame which only includes one symbol to confirm the requested time for synchronization. 
B. TRANSMISSIONS OF AUTHENTICATION AND JAMMING SIGNALS
As illustrated in Fig. 3 , the transmissions of authentication and jamming signals at time t + 1 includes two phases. In the first phase transmission (Fig. 3a) , transmitter X sends a frame including the signal to be authenticated to R. This signal consists of both pilot and data symbols. Concurrently, receiver B sends a jamming frame with jamming signal to R in a cooperative manner, making the untrusted R to receive a composite signal of authentication and jamming signals. Here, the jamming signals can be generated by utilizing a pseudo-random noise generator such as the one in [41] and is then stored at B. Without loss of generality, we use v(t) and P B to jamming signal and the average symbol power transmitted by B. When the transmitter is A (i.e., X = A), (8) becomes (13), as shown at the bottom of this page. As shown in Fig. 3b , the composite signal given in (13) is then multiplied by an amplification factor given in (9) at R and retransmitted to B in the second phase transmission [33] .
After receiving the composite signal of jamming and authentication signals, B first removes the jamming signal through the well-developed self-interference cancellation techniques [42] , [43] , and thus extracts the desired signal (i.e., consisting of pilot and data symbols) from the unknown transmitter X (when X = A, the received signal at B has the same expression as (10)). Since the generated jamming signal is known to B, it can be eliminated up to a certain extent through efficient techniques of interference cancellation [42] , [43] . To present the optimal authentication performance of the proposed E2E PLA scheme, we follow the ideal assumption here that perfect cancellation of self-interference is achievable [44] . As shown in Fig. 4 , the estimation of CA/DI are first performed. Based on the estimation results of CA/DI, quantization is then handled to qualify the temporal variations of CA/DI. Finally, B decides whether the current frame is from A or not under a simple binary hypothesis test.
Notice that CA and DI of cascaded channel can be estimated by using the deterministic pilot symbols, but only a noisy version of cascaded channel is available at B due to the presence of AWGN. The estimation error caused by such AWGN is random and independent of the channel, and can be modeled as AWGN random variable with zero mean.
a: CA ESTIMATION
Letĥ n AB (t) (resp.ĥ EB,n EB (t)) denote the estimation of h n AB (t) (resp. h EB,n EB (t)) at time t, and then each of them can be modeled as a sum of its real value and a complex Gaussian noise (i.e., estimation error) w h (t) ∼ CN (0, σ 2 w ). Then, we havê
where σ 2 w is defined as σ 2 w = P w /P with P w representing the average noise power at the receiver, respectively [20] .
b: DI ESTIMATION
Actually, the DI of each adjacent paths pair in a cascaded channel can be considered to be the superposition of DIs of each adjacent multipath components pair in two hops over that paths pair. This is because that the delays of multipath channels are spatially uncorrelated, and the processing time at each entity is sufficiently small and thus can be neglected [28] . Letτ
(t) and τ (2) k AR (t), respectively. Similar to the estimation of CA, each of them can also be considered as a sum of its real value and an AWGN (estimation error) w τ (t), they can be written, respectively, aŝ
where w ( )
w /2). Letτ k AR (t) denote the estimation of τ k AR (t), and then we havê
It can be seen from (16) 
2) CA/DI QUANTIZATION a: CA QUANTIZATION
To quantify the temporal variation of CA, we use a CA quantizer which compares the square of absolute value of the CA difference between the current and previous CA estimations of the same path at adjacent time with a specified CA threshold. In particular, when the difference is not larger than the specified CA threshold, the output of CA quantizer is 0; otherwise, the output of that is 1. We use Q h and O h,n to denote CA quantizer and the n th output of CA quantizer, respectively, where n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N } and N = min{N XR N RB , N AR N RB }. Then, CA quantization can be formulated as
where δ h represents the specified CA threshold.
b: DI QUANTIZATION
To quantify the temporal variation of DI, a DI quantizer is employed by comparing the absolute value of the DI difference between the current and previous DI estimations of the same paths pair at adjacent time with a specified time threshold. Specifically, when the difference is not larger than the specified time threshold, the output of DI quantizer is 0; otherwise, the output of that is 1. Let Q τ and O τ,k denote DI quantizer and the k th output of the quantizer, respectively, where k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}. Then, DI quantization can be formulated as
where δ τ is the specified time threshold.
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Let h and τ represent the sum of O h,n and O τ,k , respectively, and then we have
It is easy to see that we have h ∈ {0, 1, ..., N } and τ ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}.
3) DECISION
Based on the above quantization results, we establish a decision criterion under a binary hypothesis test to differentiate between legitimate frame from A and illegitimate frame from E. For simplicity, we denote by the sum of h and τ , and then the binary hypothesis test can be formulated as
where Z represents a non-negative integer decision threshold between 0 and 2N − 1. Under H 0 , the newly received frame at B is still from legitimate transmitter A, Under H 1 , it is from adversary E. However, there are still two failure events in the authentication process: 1) false alarm (FA), which occurs when a frame transmitted by legitimate transmitter A is mistakenly regarded as unauthentic; 2) missed detection (MD), which occurs when a frame originated from illegitimate transmitter E is wrongly judged as authentic.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The location-specific characteristics of CA and DI make the proposed E2E PLA scheme immune to impersonate attacks from external attackers. Meanwhile, jamming signals can confuse the untrusted R and thus avoid simple replay attack from the possible internal attacker R. Furthermore, due to the lack of pilots and any pre-known reference symbols in authentication request signal, the attackers cannot probe channel in advance. All of these properties ensure the security of this scheme, as analyzed in the followings.
(1) A simple attacker E: When attacker E is located near a legitimate transmitter A, it will fail to impersonate A by inject aggressive signals due to that both CA and DI are locationspecific.
(2) A smart attacker E: Due to the presence of artificial jamming, it becomes much more difficult (if not impossible) to estimate multipath channels A-E and E-R via the authentication signal transmitted by A, even the attacker E is close to R. Therefore, the smart attacker E will fail to construct multipath channel A-R and E-R and impersonate A by modifying its signal.
(3) Untrusted relay R: Although the untrusted relay R or other active attacker E are able to replay signals based on what they obtained, the proposed E2E PLA scheme can be immune to such attacks. This is mainly due to the fact that artificial jamming is randomly generated by B and different artificial jamming sequences that are unknown to attackers are generated at different time slots. 
IV. MODELING OF PROBABILITIES FOR FA AND MD
In this section, we first derive some basic results regarding the probabilities that the outputs of two quantizers under two hypotheses are 1, respectively, and then use the results to derive the expressions for the probabilities of FA and MD.
A. PROBABILITY OF FA
We now present the following lemmas regarding the probability denoted by P ζ,H 0 that Q ζ outputs 1 under H 0 , where ζ = {h, τ }.
Lemma 1: For a given CA threshold δ h and h n RB (t − 1), P h,H 0 can be evaluated as
where α = α AR α RB ≤ 1 is the equivalent auto-correlation coefficient of h n AB . Proof: Under H 0 , the newly received signal at B is regarded to be from A, i.e., X = A. Based on (3), we first explore the CA evolution of cascaded multipath channels with the time-series model [45] . The time-series model of h n AB can be written as
Let h A,A denote the difference betweenĥ n AB (t) and h n AB (t − 1), which is given by h A,A ĥ n AB (t) −ĥ n AB (t − 1)
Since h n AR (t − 1)h n RB (t − 1) term in (25) follows complex double Gaussian distribution under Rayleigh fading model [46] , it is difficult (if not possible) to analytically model h A,A . It is interesting to see that for a given h n RB (t − 1), h n AR (t − 1)h n RB (t − 1) follows complex Gaussian distribution. In the concerned network scenario, B extracts h n RB (t − 1) by exploiting the blind channel estimation techniques widely adapted in previous studies [41] . Therefore, for a given h n RB (t − 1), h A,A is also a complex Gaussian distributed random variable with zero mean and variance σ 2
(30b)
the exponential distribution and its cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be given by
According to (18) , P h,H 0 can be determined as
Substituting (26) into (27), we can obtain (23). Lemma 2: For a given time threshold δ τ , P τ,H 0 can be evaluated as
(29b) Proof: See Appendix A for the proof. The following lemma is dedicated to the distribution of , which is of vital importance for the derivation of the probabilities of FA and MD.
Lemma 3: Suppose that z is a non-negative integer between 0 and 2N − 1, then the probability that equals z under H 0 is given by (30) , shown at the top of this page.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 3 is straightforward, and a similar one can be found in [21, Appendix] .
We use P fa to represent the probability of FA. Then, we can establish the following main results on P fa based on Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
Theorem 1: P fa of the proposed E2E PLA scheme in a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay can be given in (31) , shown at the top of this page.
Proof: Based on (22) and the law of total probability formula, P fa can be given by
Therefore, P fa can be derived based on the following two cases: When Z ∈ [0, N − 1], substituting (30a) into (32), P fa can be given in (31a); when Z ∈ [N , 2N − 1], substituting (30b) into (32), we can obtain (31b).
Corollary 1: In a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay, P fa of the proposed E2E PLA scheme utilizing the location-specific of CA separately to discriminate transmitters, can be given by
B. PROBABILITY OF MD
Under H 1 , the current transmitter is regarded as E, i.e., X = E. The following lemmas are dedicated to regarding VOLUME 7, 2019 the probability denoted by P ζ,H 1 that Q ζ outputs 1 under H 1 , where ζ = {h, τ }.
Lemma 4: For a given CA threshold δ h and h n RB (t − 1), P h,H 1 can be evaluated as
where 
Proof: See Appendix C for the proof. We use P md to represent the probability of missed detection. Then, we can establish the following main results on P md based on Lemmas 3,4 and 5.
Theorem 2: P md of the proposed E2E PLA scheme in a dual-hop wireless network with an untrusted relay can be given in (38) , shown at the bottom of this page.
Proof: Based on (22), P md is expressed as
Under H 1 , P md can be derived based on the following two cases: When Z ∈ [0, N − 1], using P h,H 1 and P τ,H 1 replace P h,H 0 and P τ,H 0 in (30a), respectively, and we substitute the new resulting into (39) . Then, P md can be given by (38a); when Z ∈ [N , 2N − 1], following a similar manner, P md can be given by (38b). 
V. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS

A. SYSTEM PARAMETERS AND SIMULATION SETTING
We list in Table 1 the main system parameters that determine the authentication performance in terms of P fa and P md . We useγ to denote the average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) per hop and use κ h to denote the ratio of average CA gains for A-R and E-R. Since σ 2 w = P w /P, the variance of noise σ 2 w in the equation ofγ is inversely proportional to the average transmit power P for a given P w . In our simulation, we set
, and then adjust the parameters σ 2 h ER and σ 2 τ ER to achieve a specified κ h . To validate the theoretical modeling, a dedicated simulator in MATLAB is developed, which is now available at [47] . The time-varying channels are generated by using the method introduced in [48] . The temporal correlation of the timevarying channels is a function of the normalized Doppler frequency that is affected by the mobility, carrier frequency and symbol duration. Based on the normalized Doppler frequencies illustrated in Table 2 , we consider three fading channels associated with correlation coefficients (i.e., α AR , α RB , α = α AR α RB , β AR , β RB ). Different normalized Doppler frequency values in Table 2 correspond to different moving velocity of entity under a given carrier frequency and symbol duration [33] . For a fair comparison, the number of multipath components for A-R and E-R are both fixed to be 3, while that of multipath components for R-B is fixed to be 2. For Monte-Carlo experiments, 10 5 independent trails are conducted to obtain the average results.
FIGURE 5. The authentication performance (P fa , P md ) for the proposed scheme based on CA-DI or CA vs. average SNR per hop (γ AR =γ RB =γ ) under slow-fading channels.
B. MODEL VALIDATION THE PROBABILITIES OF FA AND MD
To verify the theoretical results, we summarize in Fig. 5 both the simulation and theoretical models of P fa and P md for the proposed E2E PLA scheme based on CA-DI or CA, where the slow-fading channels and settings of (Z = 3, κ h = 0 dB, δ h = 1, δ τ = 2) are assumed. Fig. 5 shows clearly that the simulation results agree well with the theoretical ones, confirming that our theoretical models can be used to nicely characterize P fa and P md . It can also be seen from Fig. 5 that as the average SNR per hopγ increases, P fa for the proposed E2E PLA scheme based on CA-DI or CA declines rapidly, whereas the corresponding P md increases slowly. This reveals that a trade-off exists between reliability and security in term of P fa and P md . Moreover, Fig. 5 shows that whenγ is small, the proposed scheme jointly using CA and DI outperforms that only using CA in terms of P md . While for P fa , the result is reverse. This is due to the fact that by jointly utilizing the location-specific properties of cascaded channel in terms of CA and DI, the proposed scheme can effectively detect impersonation attacks at the cost of incurring more false alarm events. In addition, it can be observed from Fig. 5 that whenγ is large (e.g.,γ ≥ 12dB), P fa for the proposed E2E PLA scheme based on either CA-DI or CA approaches 0, but this scheme jointly using CA and DI still outperforms that only using CA in terms of P md .
FIGURE 6.
Effect of average SNR per hop (γ AR =γ RB =γ ) on the authentication performance (P fa , P md ) vs. decision threshold Z under slow-fading channels.
C. CONTROL OF THE PROBABILITIES OF FA AND MD
To demonstrate that the proposed scheme enables the authentication performance to be flexibly controlled in a large region, we now explore how P fa and P md vary with parameters Z , δ h and δ τ . Fig. 6 shows the effect ofγ on the P fa and P md versus Z , where the slow-fading channels and settings of (κ h = 0 dB, δ h = 1.5, δ τ = 2) are assumed. As observed from Fig. 6 , P md increases rapidly as Z increases, while P fa declines quickly with Z . It is interesting to notice that P fa is extremely sensitive to the variations of Z . For example, when Z ≥ 4, P fa approaches 0 underγ = {8 dB, 10 dB, 12 dB}. We can see from Fig. 6 that for a fixed Z , P fa decreases with γ while P md increases withγ . Noticed that for an authentication system, both P fa and P md are in general required to be below 0.1 [19] - [21] , [49] . Therefore, for the specified P fa and P md constraints (e.g., P fa , P md ≤ 0.1), we can increase the transmit power and find an optimal setting of Z . For example, we can set Z = 1 andγ ≥ 10 dB to ensure P fa , P md ≤ 0.1. It is notable, however, that for general wireless networks applications, the total power of system is limited to a certain level due to the energy constraint and the interference requirement among simultaneous transmissions, so it is of great significance to find the optimal setting of parameters δ h and δ τ to satisfy the specified P fa and P md constraints under a given Z and power limitation. Fig. 7 shows how P fa and P md vary with parameters (δ h , δ τ ) under the slow-fading channels and settings of (Z = 1, γ = 10 dB, κ h = 0 dB). As shown in Fig. 7a (resp. Fig. 7b ) that for a specified constraint p fa of P fa (resp. a specified constraint p md of P md ), we can accordingly set a specified constraint plane intersecting the z-axis orthogonally at the point (2, 2, p fa ) (resp. at the point (2, 2, p md )), and then can determine a set of (δ h , δ τ )-pairs corresponding to the surface below the defined constraint plane. By finding the intersection of these two sets of (δ h , δ τ )-pairs, we can obtain the region of (δ h , δ τ )-pairs to achieve the P fa and P md constraints in terms of p fa and p md . For example, when δ h , δ τ ∈ [0.2, 3], one can observe from Fig. 7 that the requirement of P fa ≤ 0.1 can be achieved in the regions of (δ h ∈ [1, 3], δ τ ∈ [1.2, 3]), while the requirement of P md ≤ 0.1 is achieved in the regions of (δ h ∈ [0.2, 2.5], δ τ ∈ [0.2, 2.2]). Thus, the constraints of (P fa , P md ≤ 0.1) under the considered network scenario are achieved when δ h ∈ [1, 2.5] and δ τ ∈ [1.2, 2.2]. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 indicate that the proposed E2E PLA scheme is flexible and general, since P fa and P md can be flexibly controlled by a proper setting of the decision threshold Z , CA threshold δ h , and time threshold δ τ . Also, a tradeoff between reliability and security can be controlled by an appropriate setting of δ h and δ τ .
D. AUTHENTICATION EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
To illustrate the authentication efficiency of the proposed E2E PLA scheme, we further explore the authentication performance of the scheme under diverse network scenarios with different positions of E and different channels statuses. Fig. 8 shows the effect of the position of E on the authentication performance (P fa , P md ) versusγ under slow-fading channels, where Z = 1, δ h = 1.5, δ τ = 2, and κ h varies from −5 dB to 5 dB. We can see from Fig. 8 that P fa is not affected by the variations of κ h . This is because that the position of E is not related to FA events. It is noticed that for a fixedγ , P md increases as κ h reduces. We also find that whenγ is small, the setting of κ h has a little impact on P md ; whenγ is large, FIGURE 8. Effect of κ h on the authentication performance (P fa , P md ) vs. average SNR per hop (γ AR =γ RB =γ ) under slow-fading channels.
the setting of κ h has a significant impact on P md , especially when κ h = −5 dB, P md approaches 0.1. It implies that a ''smart'' intruder E would seek a position where it could have the higher probability to impersonate attacks successfully. Fortunately, the proposed scheme can adjust dynamically the optimal setting of (Z , δ h , δ τ ) to resist against such attacks. This indicates that for various positions of E, the proposed scheme is efficient to discriminate transmitters through the proper settings of (Z , δ h , δ τ ).
Finally, Fig. 9 demonstrates that the effect of channel status on the authentication performance (P fa , P md ) versusγ , given that Z = 1, κ h = 0 dB, δ h = 1.5, δ τ = 2. Notice also that in terms of P fa , the proposed scheme under case I (slow-fading channels) outperforms that under the others (case II and case III), and the scheme under case III (fasterfading channels) leads to the highest P fa . This indicates that excessive false alarm events will happen when channels are FIGURE 9. Effect of channel status on the authentication performance (P fa , P md ) vs. average SNR per hop (γ AR =γ RB =γ ).
faster-fading (e.g. in a higher mobile scenario). However, in terms of P md , the proposed scheme under faster-fading channels has the lowest P md , which means that the fasterfading channels are beneficial for effectively detecting impersonation attacks. Fig. 9 confirms that under various channels statuses, the proposed scheme is also efficient in identifying transmitters by a proper setting of the decision threshold Z , CA threshold δ h , time threshold δ τ and average SNR per hopγ .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper represents an attempt to explore the E2E PLA issue for dual-hop wireless networks by exploiting the intrinsic properties of cascaded multipath channels. We showed that the proposed E2E PLA scheme is not only efficient in discrimination between the legitimate and illegitimate transmitters, but also resistant to impersonating attacks with the attacker near the legitimate transmitter and resistant to replay attacks with aggressive signals from the untrusted relay. We also proved that the proposed scheme is flexible and general in the sense that this scheme makes it possible for us to flexibly control the probabilities of FA and MD in a large region through the proper settings of parameters. This is an important property for wireless networks to support various applications of different authentication performance requirements. In addition, it is expected that the proposed authentication scheme and related theoretical models will be useful for providing a guideline to devise the coping strategies under various attacks, as well as for understanding the fundamental E2E authentication performance of multi-hop wireless networks.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let τ AR =τ k AR (t) −τ k AR (t − 1) and τ RB =τ k RB (t) − τ k RB (t − 1), and τ A,A =τ k AB (t) −τ k AB (t − 1), then τ AB can be further written as
To explore the distribution of random variable τ A,A , we first examine that of τ AR . Based on (16), τ AR can be written as (42) , shown at the top of the next page. Combining (7), (15) and (16), the random variable C 1 defined in (42) can be given by
Since τ
and w (1) τ are independent Gaussian distributed random variables with zero mean, C 1 is also a Gaussian distributed random variable with zero mean and variance σ 2
w . After a similar derivation, C 2 , C 3 , C 4 are also Gaussian distributed random variables with zero means and variances with σ 2
, and σ 2
w . It is easy to see that C 1 , C 2 , C 3 and C 4 are independent of each other, and we have
According to [50, 
After a similar derivation, we can know that τ RB also follows the Laplace distribution
According to [50, Eq.(2.3.23) ], the probability density function (PDF) of the sum of two independent Laplace distributed random variables τ AR and τ RB can be determined as 
Based on (19) , the probability that Q τ outputs 1 under H 0 , can be determined as 
Substituting (48) into (49), we can obtain (28) .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Let h E,A represent the difference betweenĥ n EB (t) and h n AB (t − 1). Combining (14) and (24), h E,A is determined as h E,A ĥ n EB (t) −ĥ n AB (t − 1)
= α RB h n ER (t)h n RB (t − 1)
+ h n ER (t) 1 − α 2 RB u n RB (t − 1) − h n AR (t − 1)h n RB (t − 1)
For a given h n RB (t − 1), 
Based on (18) , P h,H 1 can be evaluated as
Substituting (51) into (52), we can get (34) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Let τ E,A =τ k EB (t) −τ k AB (t − 1) and τ EA =τ k ER (t) − τ k AR (t − 1), and then we have τ E,A τ EA + τ RB . Based on (16), τ EA can be further written as τ EA (τ Similar to the derivation of (45), we know that τ EA is also a Laplace distributed random variable [50] , that is,
Similarly, we can derive the PDF of the sum of two independent Laplace distributed random variables τ EA and τ RB by applying [50, 
The CDF of | τ E,A | can be given by
According to (19) , the probability that Q τ outputs 1 under H 1 can be given by
Finally, substituting (56) into (57) yields (36 
